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Distinguishing Between Consensual and
Nonconsensual Advantages of Liability Rules
Ian Ayrest and Eric Talleyt
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell's thoughtful reply to our recent article
contains powerful insights about the relative efficiency of liability and property
rules.' While we are in agreement that liability rules can be more efficient
than property rules when transaction costs are low, we disagree about the cause
of this liability-rule advantage. Kaplow and Shaveli believe that liability rules
hold only a nonconsensual advantage over property rules (i.e., liability rules
tend to induce efficient nonconsensual takings). While granting this oft-
recognized nonconsensual advantage, we contend that liability rules may also
have a consensual advantage in low-transaction-cost settings (i.e., liability rules
facilitate trade). We use this Comment as a forum to articulate our side of the
story.
Our answer consists of two parts. In Part I, we locate the current debate
within the broader context of entitlement form, transaction costs, and
bargaining. In Part II, we provide an example that distinguishes between the
consensual and nonconsensual advantages of liability rules.
I. LOCATING THE DEBATE
Before plunging into the technical arguments, it may first be helpful to
contextualize our initial contribution and its relation to the debate between
ourselves and Kaplow and Shavell. In Solomonic Bargaining, we ventured into
what we termed "the economic purgatory between the findings of Coase and
of Calabresi and Melamed."' This phrase bears elaboration.
Calabresi and Melamed argued persuasively that, when transaction costs
make consensual transfer prohibitively expensive, liability rules are likely to
dominate property rules because liability rules more closely replicate the
t William K. Townsend Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
t" Assistant Professor, University of Southern California Law Center. Jennifer Brown, Dick Craswell,
Ed MeCaffery, Jeff Strand, and Chris Sanchirico provided helpful comments.
1. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres
and Talley, 105 YALE LJ. 221 (1995). Kaplow and Shavell's reply responds to Ian Ayres & Eric Talley,
Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement To Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE LJ. 1027
(1995).
2. Ayres & Talley, supra note 1, at 1098.
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outcome that transaction costs preclude.3 When transacting is costless, Coase
tells us that liability and property rules are equally efficient.4
In the last twenty-some years, numerous law-and-economics scholars have
attempted to connect the dots between these efficiency benchmarks
characterized by Coase, on the one hand, and Calabresi and Melamed, on the
other. In this so-called "economic purgatory," transaction costs are positive but
not prohibitive.5 Richard Posner has characteristically offered a lucid and
3. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972). Calabresi and Melasned's account of the
nonconsensual (or so-called "Hobbesian") case within jurisprudential categories deserves substantial credit
Under a property rule, nonholders of an entitlement must bargain with holders to effect a transfer of
ownership. Under a liability rule, however, one may interfere nonconsensually with the entitlements of
another, but must subsequently reimburse the nominal owner with a market-mimicking "price" (also known
as damages). Ayres & Talley, supra note 1, at 1106-10. Kaplow and Shavell, in a separate piece, have
placed this insight on a much firmer theoretical ground. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property
Rules Versus Liability Rules (Harvard Law School Program in Law and Economics, Discussion Paper No.
156, Mar. 1995) (forthcoming 109 HARV. L. REV., 1995). They show that, even if damages are set
imprecisely, liability rules can induce beneficial nonconsensua taking. As long as the damages are an
unbiased estimate of the victim's injury, injurers will cause harm only when their benefits exceed the
average harm that they cause. Id. at 17-20. Kaplow and Shavell's insight is important because the current
prohibitions against awarding "speculative" damages may be misplaced if we believe that factfinders can
generate imprecise, but unbiased, estimates of damages.
In Solomonic Bargaining, we also made an argument for inaccurate or "untailored" liability rules, but
one that was different than Kaplow and Shavell's. We stressed that inaccuracy may be even better than
accuracy when bargaining is allowed, as it affects the revelation of valuable information. See Ayres &
Talley, supra note 1, at 1065-72. A number of recent papers have noticed this tendency in various other
contexts as well. See Jason S. Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. &
ORGANIZATION (forthcoming Oct. 1995) (arguing that bargaining under standards may be more efficient
than bargaining under rules); Kathryn Spier, Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards, 10
J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 84 (1994) (arguing that finely tuned damage awards increase probability that
litigants will disagree, thereby aggravating settlement process); Eric L. Talley, Contract Renegotiation,
Mechanism Design, and the Liquidated Damages Rule, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1195, 1198-99 (1994)
[hereinafter Talley, Liquidated Damages] (arguing that nonenforcement of penal liquidated damages clauses
can increase economic efficiency by inducing more efficient contract negotiation); Eric L. Talley, Property
Rights, Liability Rules, and Coasean Bargaining Under Incomplete Information 26-33 (John M. Olin
Program in Law and Economics, Stanford Law School, Working Paper No. 114, Aug. 1994) [hereinafter
Talley, Property Rights]. Indeed, Kaplow and Shavell appear to have no quarrel with this point. See Kaplow
& Shavell, supra note 1, at 222 n.5.
Even though liability rules tend to induce beneficial taking, we will show below that the costs of
nonconsensual transfer (e.g., litigation costs) can make property rules more efficient. See infra text
accompanying notes 34-35.
4. This is an implication of the well-known Coase Theorem, which asserts that, so long as parties can
contract frictionlessly, efficiency simply happens no matter what form the initial entitlements take. See
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
5. When friction grows large, however, the Posnerian thesis asserts that the costs of inducing an
agreement will become too great, and it would be more prudent to adopt a public-ordering scheme (such
as liability rules) to approximate market outcomes. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
57 (4th ed. 1992). We cite Posner here principally for his clear thesis and summary of the literature. Others,
such as A. Mitchell Polinsky, have made substantial contributions to this literature. See A. Mitchell
Polinsky, Controlling Externalities and Protecting Entitlements: Property Right, Liability Rule, and Tax-
Subsidy Approaches, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1979) [hereinafter Polinsky, Controlling Externalities]; A.
Mitchell Polinsky, On the Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules, 18 ECON. INQUIRY 233
(1980); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and
Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1075 (1980) [hereinafter Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes].
Posner's theory that property rules are efficient in low transaction costs settings is explicitly based on the
claim that property rules tend to "channel ... transactions through the market." POSNER, supra, at 230.
While we attribute this thesis to Posner, many academics (including, until recently, ourselves) accepted its
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powerful theory by arguing that, in settings with "low" transaction costs,
property rules are more efficient than liability rules because they channel
transactions into the market.
6
Solomonic Bargaining challenged this view in the context of a specific
type of transaction cost: private information. Our core insight was that
dividing an entitlement between two negotiators could cause more forthright
and efficient bargaining.' Essentially, we argued that these so-called
Solomonic divisions tend to obscure the titular boundary between "buyer" and
"seller" during bargaining and, in so doing, dampen the parties' strategic
incentives to "shade up" or "shade down" their privately known valuations. We
argued that numerous entitlement divisions can cause this phenomenon,
including divisions along use, space, and time dimensions; divided ownership
through judicial randomness (i.e., "probabilistic" divisions); and divided
ownership through untailored liability rules. 9
It is with our extended analysis of this last form of division that Kaplow
and Shavell find their sole quarrel. They agree with us that liability rules can
be more efficient than property rules." They part company with us, however,
in interpreting the cause of this postbargaining advantage. Kaplow and Shavell
argue that our analysis of liability rules failed to distinguish between the
consensual and nonconsensual attributes of liability rules, and they conjecture
that any advantage liability rules possess stems not from bargaining, but rather
from the persistence of the Calabresi-Melamed "head start" that liability rules
enjoy in the absence of bargaining."t More explicitly, they argue that liability
rules have a nonconsensual advantage over property rules when trade is not
possible, and that this nonconsensual advantage tends to persist once
bargaining is allowed. While Solomonic Bargaining focused on a consensual
advantage of liability rules (i.e., that liability rules could facilitate trade),
Kaplow and Shavell attribute the efficiency of liability rules in our example
validity. See sources cited in Ayres & Talley, supra note 1, at 1032-33 nn.17-18.
6. See POSNER, supra note 5, at 57 (noting that "[in settings with low transaction costs] the law should
require the parties to transact in the market; it can do this by making the present owner's property right
absolute (or nearly so), so that anyone who thinks the property is worth more has to negotiate with the
owner"); see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE EcoNoMIc STRUCrURE OF TORT LAW
48 (1987) ("The purpose of awarding punitive damages is to direct these transactions into the market, where
they belong, because market transaction costs are low in these cases .... ").
7. Informational asymmetries represent transaction costs because they often give parties the incentive
to misrepresent their private knowledge, thereby retarding, delaying, or even thwarting potentially efficient
trades. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 1, at 1030.
8. The technical term for such phenomena is "countervailing incentives." See id. at 1030 n.8 (citing
sources).
9. See id. at 1033-35. The exact manner in which liability rules can help to elicit information
revelation is restated infra in the text accompanying notes 29-33.
10. Moreover, Kaplow and Shavell apparently concur with the observations we made concerning other
types of entitlement division. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 1, at 222 n.5.
I1. See id. at 228-29. Kaplow and Shavell, consistent with this characterization, hypothesize that, as
we move closer to the Coasean ideal of zero transaction costs, this head start still persists, but decreases
in magnitude. See id.
19951
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to the persistence of a nonconsensual advantage (i.e., that liability rules tend
to induce taking by higher valuers). While we agree with Kaplow and Shavell
that liability rules enjoy a "head start" in this horse race (before bargaining
occurs), we disagree with their conjecture that this head start alone preordains
the outcome of the race (after bargaining). Instead, we maintain that bargaining
concerns can play an important (and possibly first-order) role in the normative
choice between liability and property rules.
A diagram representing the competing views may help flesh out the debate
more fully. Figure 1 heuristically depicts the relative efficiency of property
rules and liability rules as transaction costs vary between zero and infinity. t2
The origin of the diagram represents the Coase Theorem benchmark of zero
transaction costs. 13 Here, property and liability rules are indistinguishable
from an efficiency standpoint-neither produces any inefficiency. The right
side of the diagram corresponds to the other polar extreme, in which
transaction costs are infinitely high. Here, there is no bargaining, and Calabresi
and Melamed's nonconsensual "head start" of liability rules over property rules
frequently prevails.1 4
It
n Calabresi & Melamed
ef Liability Rule Head Start
f t




12. At the outset, we stress that there is no natural way to quantify transaction costs, and many types
of transaction costs (such as asymmetric information) are difficult to represent on a smooth continuum. See
Ayres & Talley, supra note 1, at 1036 ("[Ihe type of transaction cost matters: It is inadequate to think
of 'transaction costs' as some sort of composite good whose components imply similar policies.").
Nevertheless, Figure I is illuminating, and we will refer to it frequently in the pages below.
13. It is somewhat misleading to associate the adjective "Coasean" with zero transaction costs, since
Coase spent so much of his career arguing against the assumption of zero transactions costs. See Robert
C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against "Coaseanisrm," 99 YALE L.J. 611 (1989).
14. Liability rules may not have a nonconsensual "head start" if litigation is costly. See infra text
accompanying notes 27-28 and Figure 2.
[Vol. 105: 235
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Between these two extremes, we can use Figure 1 to distinguish between
the competing characterizations of relative efficiency outlined above, which,
for convenience, we associate with the names of Posner, Kaplow and Shavell,
and ourselves. For the purposes of exposition, we posit a fixed, linear relation
between the size of transaction costs and the inefficiency under a property
rule' 5-and show what the three theories say about the relative shape of the
liability-rule curve.
The Posnerian thesis is depicted by the "Liability Rule1 (Posner)" curve.
The strictly concave shape of this curve is intended to depict the asserted
dominance of property rules in low-friction settings and the eventual point
where liability rules overtake property rules as transaction costs grow.
16
Kaplow and Shavell's argument is depicted by the linear "Liability Rule2
(Kaplow & Shavell)" schedule. The linearity of this curve illustrates their
"persistence conjecture" in that the relative efficiency at the endpoints of the
diagram will tend to dictate the position of the curves in the interior. 7
Finally, the possibility that we raised in Solomonic Bargaining-that liability
rules might facilitate more efficient bargaining-appears as the "Liability Rule3
(Ayres & Talley)" schedule. The convex shape of this curve is intended to
depict our assertion that a postbargaining advantage of liability rules might
reflect more than the simple preservation of the head start, because liability
rules can also work to lubricate consensual transactions between the parties. s
It is important to emphasize that these three conceptions of relative
efficiency (depicted in Figure 1) also make different claims about the
likelihood that a particular advantage will obtain. The Posnerian conception
makes the strongest claim: When transaction costs are low, property rules will
15. Because there often is no natural metric for measuring the size of transaction costs, the figure
arbitrarily calibrates transaction cost so as to make the property-rule line linear. We might just as easily
posit a linear liability rule and show three property-rule lines.
16. If Posner accepts the Calabresi and Melamed thesis that liability rules tend to be efficient when
contracting is impossible, then the liability-rule and property-rule curves must intersect at least once. But
Posner does not suggest at what level of transaction costs we might expect such a crossover point.
17. The persistence conjecture essentially interpolates between the Coasean ideal and the Calabresi and
Melamed head start. Thus, even if this schedule is not linear, their analysis implies linearity as a central
tendency. Figure I also illuminates how Kaplow and Shavell's persistence theory underlies their two core
conjectures about the relative efficiency of liability and property rules when bargaining is possible but
imperfect:
First Conjecture: "[T]he liability rule will tend to produce greater total welfare than property
rules (but the advantage of the liability rule will be less than when bargaining is impossible)."
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 1, at 224. This conjecture is depicted in Figure 1 because the "Liability
Rule;" schedule is everywhere below the "Property Rule" schedule.
Second Conjecture: "[P]roperty rules will lead to greater bargaining-related welfare gains than
does the liability rule."
Id. (emphasis omitted). This conjecture is depicted in Figure I because the "Property Rule" line has a
steeper slope than the "Liability Rule2" line.
18. This "consensual" advantage is not the only reason that liability rules may be more efficient than
property rules. Rather, we hypothesize that Solomonic bargaining as well as the nonconsensual head start
could make liability rules more efficient. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 1, at 1059 n.101.
1995]
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always be more efficient than liability rules.' 9 Kaplow and Shavell make a
more modest claim, that liability rules "tend to be" more efficient.2" And, on
this likelihood dimension, our thesis is the most modest. We only claim that
liability rules might facilitate trade as indicated by "Liability Rule3."' The
goal of Solomonic Bargaining was to provide a "possibility theorem." By
showing that liability rules could produce a more efficient equilibrium with
more contracting, we refuted the strong-form Posnerian claim that property
rules must be more efficient than liability rules when transaction costs are low.
To be sure, we believe that property rules are often efficient, but a primary
goal of Solomonic Bargaining was to show that the efficiency of property rules
could not be justified by the traditional claims that they are "market
encouraging"; liability rules can channel even more transactions into the
market and produce a more efficient equilibrium. We developed an example
that contradicted the Posnerian thesis in that an untailored liability rule
produced larger gains from trade and more contracting than a property rule.2
19. Although Posner and like-minded scholars do not use the adverb "always," the unqualified, a priori
terms in which the thesis is put at least are susceptible to this interpretation. See supra note 6.
20. Kaplow and Shavell would readily admit that bargaining might make a property rule more efficient
than a liability rule (as depicted in Figure 1 by "Liability Rule,"). See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 1,
at 223-24. Indeed, our analysis of tailored liability rules provides just such an example: The tailored
liability rule is more efficient when bargaining is not possible, but becomes less efficient when bargaining
is possible. The perverse effects of tailoring demonstrate that bargaining can have dominant effects on the
relative efficiency of liability and property rules. Kaplow and Shavell offer no reason to suggest why these
dominant effects can only run in one direction (why we might have "Liability Rule," but not "Liability
Rule3 "). The core purpose of this Comment is to show that bargaining rules can also have a first-order
effect in improving the relative efficiency of liability rules.
21. At several points in their comment, Kaplow and Shavell lose sight of this fact. For example, they
point to a variation in our bargaining model (where the defendants' valuation can take on any value
between $0 and $100) in which a property rule is more efficient than a liability rule. They suggest that in
this variation, our "thesis is starkly contradicted." Id. at 231 (emphasis added). Our thesis, however, is not
that liability rules must be more efficient. Indeed, like Kaplow and Shavell, we believe that property rules
will often be efficient when transaction costs are low (i.e., we believe that a liability rule may induce a
curve like "Liability Rule,"). Pointing to a variation where property rules are more efficient does not starkly
contradict our thesis that liability rules might be more efficient.
Likewise, Kaplow and Shavell's repeated use of the phrase "the opposite of their thesis," see, e.g.,
id. at 222, is misleading. The opposite of our thesis, that "liability rules might facilitate trade," would be
a claim that "liability rules cannot facilitate trade." As we have said in the text, it would be appropriate for
them to say that our example does not adequately distinguish our (consensual) information-forcing effect
from their (nonconsensual) persistence effect, but it is inappropriate to say that our example showing that
a liability rule can produce more trade and higher welfare illustrates "the opposite of their [Ayres and
Talley's] thesis."
We are attracted to Kaplow and Shavell's persistence conjecture as a general tendency. See Ayres &
Talley, supra note 1, at 1059-60 n.101. But the strong theoretical rationale behind persistence as a central
tendency does not preclude the possibility of the relationships depicted by either "Liability Rule," or
"Liability Rule3." Indeed, Kaplow and Shavell's belief in persistence does not preclude the possibility that
liability rules may perform disproportionately badly when bargaining is allowed. Similarly, the persistence
conjecture does not provide any "a priori reasoning" to indicate that liability rules might not perform
disproportionately well. Accordingly, Kaplow and Shavell's assertion that "[a] priori reasoning suggests
that the opposite of [Ayres & Talley's] thesis is likely to be true," Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 1, at 222,
does not follow.
22. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 1, at 1047-61. Posner might claim that the imperfect information
in our example did not constitute a "low"-transaction-cost setting. While there is no natural metric for
measuring the size of transaction costs, the asymmetric information in our model allowed for a substantial
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This example is illustrated in Figure 1 by points P and L. The distance
between P and the horizontal axis represents the amount of inefficiency that
remains after bargaining under a property rule, and the distance between L and
this axis represents the analogous amount under a liability rule. Even with the
transaction costs in our model (i.e., asymmetric information), we found parties
contracting in the shadow of either rule; and after contracting, liability rules
were more efficient than property rules (i.e., Point L is below Point P).'
Kaplow and Shavell's criticism of this core example can also be described
using Figure 1. They agree that we have produced an example that refutes the
Posnerian claim that property rules are more efficient when transaction costs
are low, but they point out that the efficiency of the liability rule in our
example may be due to the persistence of the rule's nonconsensual advantage
and not to its ability to facilitate trade (a theoretical difference depicted by the
fact that the "Liability Rule2" schedule lies between point L and our "Liability
Rule3" schedule).
We concede that Kaplow and Shavell are right that our original example
did not adequately distinguish between the consensual and nonconsensual
advantages of liability rules.24 While the example does succeed in refuting the
Posnerian hypothesis, our article's focus on what happens as one moves away
from the point of Coasean efficiency (i.e., away from the origin in Figure 1)
blinded us to the possibility that the liability rule's nonconsensual head start
(from the other direction) might persist.
To show that liability rules can facilitate trade in a way that is distinct
from the nonconsensual head start, we need to construct an example under
which bargaining in the shadow of a liability rule disproportionately mitigates
amount of bargaining: Contracting in the shadow of a liability rule eliminated 75% of the inefficiency
associated with autarky. Moreover, the qualitative efficiency of the liability rule in our example would
persist as one collapsed the range of private valuations arbitrarily close to the mean of $50, thus coming
arbitrarily close to a zero-transaction-costs world.
23. Moreover, in our example there was a 30% chance that the parties would contract when bargaining
in the shadow of a liability rule, but only a 20% chance that they would contract in the shadow of a
property rule-casting additional doubt on the "market-creating" rationale for property rules.
24. We disagree with Kaplow and Shavell, however, about the correct standard for measuring whether
bargaining under a liability rule facilitates trade. In terms of Figure 1, Kaplow and Shavell argue that
showing liability rules might facilitate trade would require showing that the liability-rule curve had a steeper
slope than the property-rule curve (as we move away from the autarky point), while we argue that it would
be sufficient for the liability-rule curve to have only a steeper slope than the straight "Liability Rule2" line.
See infra note 45 (discussing difference in these two standards). Nevertheless, we provide an example that
satisfies both criteria. See infra note 33 (explaining why postbargaining advantage of liability rules may
often exist solely because of bargaining concerns).
Kaplow and Shavell's metric, we believe, puts excessive emphasis on the effects of infra-marginal
trades while placing too little weight on marginal effects. Adherence to this metric can lead to perverse
conclusions. For instance, even if one were able to show that liability rules (in some form) could lead to
Pareto-optimal (or "first-best") outcomes, while property rules could not, Kaplow and Shavell's metric
might nonetheless dictate that because of the initial starting positions, property rules---and not liability
rules-are the ones that "facilitate trade." We submit that a fair metric should not produce such perverse
results. As such, the percentage reduction in inefficiency is a more sensible measure.
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the "initial conditions" that prevail in the absence of bargaining. 25 The next
part provides such an example. Explicitly, we demonstrate that, while litigation
costs can dampen-and even reverse-the nonconsensual head start that
liability rules enjoy over property rules, bargaining in the shadow of litigation
costs can enhance the advantages of liability rules over property rules in the
face of these costs.
Our central disagreement with Kaplow and Shavell turns on whether the
advantage of liability rules stems solely from the persistence effect, or whether
the information-forcing effect of liability rules might at times complement the
persistence effect.26 Kaplow and Shavell carefully avoid claiming that liability
rules cannot facilitate trade; they only claim that we have not adequately
shown that they might. The next part attempts to provide a more persuasive
example.
II. LIABILITY RULES CAN FACILrATE MORE EFFICIENT BARGAINING
DESPITE A NONCONSENSUAL DISADVANTAGE
If the advantage of liability rules lies solely in the persistence of their
nonconsensual head start, then reducing or reversing this nonconsensual head
start should similarly reduce or reverse the performance of the liability rule
when bargaining is allowed. For example, Figure 2 depicts a model in which
(contrary to Calabresi and Melamed) a liability rule is less efficient than a
property rule when high transaction costs preclude bargaining. Kaplow and
Shavell's persistence hypothesis would suggest that there is a tendency for the
nonconsensual property-rule advantage to persist once bargaining is
allowed-so that for lower transaction costs we would expect point L to be
25. The debate between ourselves and Kaplow and Shavell necessarily proceeds by example and
counterexample. Kaplow and Shavell critique our use of a "single numerical example" in illustrating our
bargaining argument. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 1, at 227.
For readers familiar with informational bargaining literature, however, Kaplow and Shavell's criticism
is not a new one. Bargaining models tend to produce a multiplicity of equilibria that are sensitive to initial
modeling assumptions. Thus, much of bargaining literature (including Solomonic Bargaining) has tended
to focus on possibility claims rather than more general assertions. See DREW Ft.DENBERG & JEAN TIROLE,
GAME THEORY 398-99 (1992) (noting that the noncooperative bargaining approach has so far failed to
"solv[e] the bargaining problem," and that "[t]he theory of bargaining under incomplete information is
currently more of a series of examples than a coherent set of results").
In fact, our awareness of these frustrations explains why, in our earlier analysis, we emphasized that
the so-called "separation" phenomenon appears to be more robust-because separation is a weakly
dominant strategy. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 1, at 1042-46.
26. In Solomonic Bargaining, we stated:
Kaplow and Shavell have persuasively shown that liability rules already have a "head start" on
property rules under autarky because nonconsensual takings will tend to transfer the entitlement
to a higher-valuing owner, and that it is not surprising that this liability-rule advantage persists
in circumstances when bargaining is possible. While Kaplow and Shavell are clearly correct
about the autarkic headstart of liability rules, the information-forcing property of liability rules
may provide an independent reason that liability rules can dominate property rules when
bargaining is possible.
Ayres & Talley, supra note 1, at 1059 n.101 (citation omitted).
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above point P. At the very least, if we could show that such a liability rule
became more efficient than a property rule when bargaining was possible
(depicted by the possibility that a point L' exists below point P), then we could
say with confidence that the liability rule's efficiency does not derive from the
persistence of a nonconsensual advantage-in this example there is none-but






A number of factors might cause liability rules to be less efficient than
property rules when bargaining is impossible. In fact, Kaplow and Shaveln
themselves argue that liability rules may be imprudent if nonconsensual
transfer generates various "administrative costs"-including the cost of
litigation itself We will demonstrate, using a close variation on the model
from our earlier article, how the presence of litigation costs can make liability
rules less efficient than property rules when bargaining is not possible, yet
increase the efficiency advantage of liability rules when bargaining is possible.
To keep things simple, we will stick with the same liability-rule example
we used in Solomonic Bargaining, but we will add litigation costs of (slightly
less than) $10 that each party must pay if litigation arises after a
nonconsensual taking.28 As before, we assume the defendant's valuation can
27. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 40-42.
28. We have assumed that litigation costs are "slightly less than" $10 to make clear that a $60
defendant would have an incentive to take in the absence of bargaining (we could have achieved the same
result by making damages slightly less than $50). If the $60 defendant's litigation costs were $10, she
would be indifferent between taking nonconsensually and not taking (because the net payoff in either case
19951
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be either $40 or $60 with equal probability, and the plaintiff's valuation can
take on any value between $0 and $100 with equal probability.
By way of review, let us first quickly summarize the salient features of the
equilibrium of our initial game29 without litigation costs:3"
• Plaintiff "partitioning": In the signaling stage, the plaintiffs found it
(weakly) dominant to separate themselves into two groups: (1) those
whose valuation was less than the damages amount signaled an
interest in selling their entitlement; and (2) those whose valuation
exceeded damages signaled an interest in purchasing the defendant's
right to take."
" Offers: At the offering stage, a defendant hearing a plaintiff's
preference for selling will offer $32.50 (regardless of the defendant's
private valuation), which will be accepted by all plaintiffs who value
their entitlements at less than $15. Conversely, a defendant hearing a
plaintiff's preference for buying will demand $17.50 (again regardless
of type), which will be accepted by all plaintiffs who value their
entitlements at more than $85.32
" Outcome: After bargaining, the plaintiff property rule yields expected
social welfare of $59.75, while the liability rule set at $50 yields
expected social welfare of $59.88. 33
will be zero). Taking nonconsensually (in the absence of agreement) would still represent a plausible
equilibrium because a $60 defendant would not have an affirmative incentive to deviate from this course
of action. Assuming litigation costs to be slightly less than $10 breaks this indifference, leading a $60
defendant to take nonconsensually in the absence of agreement.
29. This game is formally defined in our earlier article. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 1, at 1048-50.
Essentially, the extensive form of this game calls for the plaintiff first to signal whether she wishes to sell
her entitlement or buy the defendant's option to take. After the plaintiff sends this signal, the defendant
makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. If the plaintiff rejects the offer, the defendant chooses whether to take
nonconsensually and pay the untailored damage amount.
30. See id. at 1050 n.77.
31. Kaplow and Shavell argue that prior writing on bargaining "t[ook] for granted" this separation
effect. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note I, at 226 n.17. They cite an unpublished and uncirculated paper
in support of this claim. See Steven Shavell, Property Rights and the Rule of Liability in a Simple
Bargaining Model (1988) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). In this paper, the author appears
to recognize implicitly the separation effect, but stresses neither its weakly dominant nature, nor its game-
theoretic generality outside of his model. This is not surprising, as the Shavell model does not involve the
type of preoffer signaling we discuss in ours.
In the variation we present below, weakly dominant plaintiff partitioning occurs as well, but with a
few caveats. See infra text accompanying notes 36-44.
32. Kaplow and Shavell correctly note that this "pooling" behavior among defendants can be
detrimental to the bargaining process. We articulated this potential drawback in our original article. See
Ayres & Talley, supra note 1, at 1055-56. As we demonstrate below, however, defendant pooling need
not always dominate. See infra text accompanying notes 42-44 (illustrating how, in litigation-costs example,
half of problem with defendant pooling disappears).
33. In making their criticisms, Kaplow and Shavell use these numbers in comparison to the "no
bargaining" outcomes ($50 and $55, respectively) to suggest that it is property rules, and not liability rules,
that facilitate trade. As mentioned above, we disagree with Kaplow and Shavell about the correct standard
for measuring whether liability rules facilitate trade. See supra note 24. Moreover, examining various other
damages amounts between $40 and $60 may provide reasons to believe that, in our original analysis, the
postbargaining advantage of liability rules over property rules is due entirely to bargaining. The rationale
for this argument is as follows: In the absence of bargaining, all such intermediate damages amounts
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Adding litigation costs to our previous model eliminates the nonconsensual
advantage of liability rules. Litigation costs do not affect the property-rule
equilibrium because the defendant would never attempt to take from the
plaintiff nonconsensually. Consequently, the property rule's level of expected
social welfare absent bargaining remains at $50. Under a $50 liability rule, it
remains the case that when bargaining is not possible only $60 defendants will
take nonconsensually.' But because of the costs of litigation, the aggregate
prebargaining expected welfare under a liability rule will be only
approximately $45, which fails $5 short of the analogous measure under a
property rule.3" As one might expect, the introduction of litigation costs
introduces a cost to nonconsensual transactions, and, in fact, it inverts the
liability-rule head start under autarky. This possibility is depicted in Figure 2
by the fact that the liability-rule line is above the property-rule line at the point
where transaction costs are infinite.
When contracting is costless, of course both liability rules and property
rules will engender efficient contracting and maximal efficiency. This again is
a direct consequence of the Coase Theorem. In this model, both rules would
give rise to an expected surplus of $63. The Kaplow-Shavell persistence
conjecture would (as we read it) predict that liability rules should now perform
uniformly worse when bargaining is possible but imperfect. This is the
consequence of simply interpolating between the two "no-bargaining" points
and the single point of Coasean efficiency.
perform equally well (producing identical expected social welfare outcomes of $55), while damages
amounts outside this range perform the same as a property rule (expected welfare of $50). Given this $5
head start within the [$40, $60] interval, the "persistence" hypothesis of Kaplow and Shavell suggests that
we should see a discontinuous jump in postbargaining welfare as we move from a damages amount just
outside this interval to one just inside it. We find no such jump; in fact, the postbargaining welfare curve
is continuous at both $40 and $60. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 1, at 1113 (fig. A2). This may suggest
that (at least for this specification of the model) the initial "head start" of liability rules as such is irrelevant
when one allows bargaining. Further, within this interior damages region, the welfare curve is parabolic,
and thus there is a unique postbargaining level of damages (i.e., $50) that maximizes expected social
welfare. Id. This parabolic shape is not implied by the "prebargaining" analysis, and therefore, we submit,
is due entirely to bargaining. For it is the $50 liability rule that gives rise to the maximum amount of
plaintiff partitioning.
Kaplow and Shavell might respond to this point by asserting that the level of damages near the
boundary of this interior region functions just like a property rule. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3,
at 34 n.64. Such a retort, however, does not follow from, and is in fact inconsistent with, their persistence
conjecture. Indeed, absent bargaining there is literally no welfare difference between any of the damages
amounts on the [$40, $60] interval.
34. Taking nonconsensually gives a $60 defendant a payoff slightly greater than zero, because its
litigation costs will be slightly less than $10 and it will have to pay $50 in damages, while choosing not
to take generates a zero payoff.
35. Half the time (when there is a $40 defendant) there will be no taking, and the expected welfare
will be the plaintiff average value of $50. Half the time (when there is a $60 defendant), there will be a
taking, and the expected welfare will be the defendant's $60 value minus approximately $20 in litigation
costs. Thus, the aggregate expected welfare for a $50 liability rule when bargaining is not possible is .5
($50) + .5 ($60 - $20) = $45.
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A. Deriving the Equilibrium Bargaining Strategies
Kaplow and Shavell's prediction, however, is not borne out in this
example. Using the same extensive-form bargaining game we analyzed in
Solomonic Bargaining, it is possible to compare a property rule to a liability
rule with respect to their abilities to engender efficient bargaining. First,
consider bargaining in the shadow of a property rule. This is the easier case
to consider, because the equilibrium is unaffected by the introduction of
litigation costs. Regardless of the level of litigation costs, defendants facing a
property rule will never attempt to take nonconsensually, and thus litigation
costs will not affect the parties' bargaining behavior. As before, all plaintiffs
will signal a willingness to sell their entitlement. The $40 and $60 defendants
will bid $20 and $30, respectively, and these bids will be accepted by any
plaintiffs who value their entitlements less than the bids. This bargaining under
a property rule increases expected social welfare from $50 to $59.75.
Under an untailored $50 liability rule, however, we find that litigation
costs do change bargaining behavior. Specifically, we find that the following
constitutes an equilibrium to the game:
(1) The plaintiff signals a willingness to sell her entitlement whenever her
valuation is less than $70, and a willingness to buy the defendant's
option when her valuation exceeds $70.
(2) If the plaintiff signals that she wishes to purchase the defendant's
option, both $40 and $60 defendants ask $15, and plaintiffs valuing
their entitlements more than $70 accept these offers.
(3) If the plaintiff signals that she wishes to sell her entitlement, the $40
defendant will offer $20, and the $60 defendant will offer (slightly
more than) $40.36 Plaintiffs valuing their entitlements less than $20
will accept the $20 offer, and all plaintiffs will accept the $60
defendant's offer.
To understand why this is an equilibrium, consider each of the parts
(1)-(3). First, the $50 liability rule induces plaintiffs to partition themselves
into "greater than $70" and "less than $70" sets, because $70 is the amount
that equalizes each plaintiff's payoff from buying the defendant's option or
selling her own entitlement." Introducing litigation costs alters our assertion
that "[u]nder liability rule protection.., only plaintiffs who value the
entitlement less than the damage amount would have an incentive to express
36. As described infra note 44, if the litigation costs are slightly less than $10, then an arbitrarily small
proportion of $60 defendants will attempt to pool with the $40 defendants by offering $20.
37. A $70 plaintiff signaling a willingness to buy defendant's option would expect in equilibrium (as
specified in (2)) to pay $15 and would have a net payoff of $55 ($70 - $15). A $70 plaintiff signaling a
willingness to sell her own entitlement would expect (as specified in (3)) to sell for (slightly more than)
$40 half the time and to reject a $20 offer half the time-thus also yielding an expected payoff of $55 (.5
($70) + .5 ($40)).
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interest in selling their entitlement.' 38 In this example, the point of division
occurs at a point substantially higher than the liability amount. The partitioning
point shifts because litigation costs introduce an additional motivation for a
plaintiff with an intermediate valuation to sell. In the original model (without
litigation costs), we noted:
A number of plaintiffs with intermediate valuations... will be
indifferent between expressing interest in the two types of Coasean
trade, because these plaintiffs know that in equilibrium they will not
be able to reach agreement with defendants exploiting their take-it-or-
leave-it power. The valuation of these plaintiffs is not sufficiently
different from the damage amount to make trade worthwhile....
Thus, in many real-world settings, we would expect plaintiffs to
partition themselves into three groups: High valuers would seek to
bribe defendants, low valuers would seek to be bribed, and
intermediate valuers would remain silent.39
But once we add litigation costs to the model, plaintiffs with intermediate
values are no longer indifferent; they may be able to capture a small share of
the bargaining surplus that is created if they consensually transfer their
entitlement to $60 defendants without incurring litigation costs. The reason to
sell to these $60 defendants is not to change the identity of the ultimate owner
(because the $60 defendant would take in the absence of trade) but to effect
the transfer in a less expensive way. The possibility of capturing a small share
of this new type of bargaining surplus leads some intermediate-value plaintiffs
(who previously were indifferent) to signal a desire to sell. Thus, because a
plaintiff with a valuation of $51 knows that she cannot profitably bribe a $60
defendant not to take,40 she has an incentive to express interest in selling her
entitlement to avoid the litigation costs.
4
'
The liability rule still has an information-forcing effect on plaintiffs. The
high-value and low-value plaintiffs still seek contracts to change the identity
of the ultimate owner: High-value plaintiffs attempt to deter inefficient transfer,
38. Ayres & Talley, supra note 1, at 1044.
39. Id at 1053 n.89.
40. Defendants in this model who are allowed to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer will find it profitable
to demand a large enough bribe that the plaintiff could earn more by selling.
41. Indeed, the defendant's offer to buy represents a unique trembling-hand equilibrium; that is, it
would survive the introduction of "trembles" into the defendant's offering strategy. As explained below,
within this class of Coasean transaction, $40 and $60 deferglants will separate completely (or almost so),
so that the $60 defendants will make revealing litigation-cost-saving offers. It is optimal for a $60
defendant to make such an offer so as to give the plaintiff the minimum gain from bargaining, and thus
the $60 defendant will offer an amount just equal to the plaintiff's net payoff after a nonconsensual taking
or to the difference between the damages amount and litigation costs (which is $40). Knowing this, a
certain range of plaintiffs may be indifferent between soliciting bids and offers from defendants.
Nonetheless, if we were to "tremble" the high-valuing defendant's offer infinitesimally above $40, it would
give all these indifferent plaintiffs an incentive to partition themselves along the lines delineated in the text.
For more on such so-called "trembling hand" equilibrium refinements, see JEAN TMROLE, THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 445-46 (1988).
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and low-value plaintiffs attempt to induce efficient transfer. Indeed, the
introduction of litigation costs enhances the information-forcing effect as the
lower cutoff for high-value plaintiffs drops from $85 to $70 and the upper
cutoff for low-value plaintiffs rises from $15 to $20. Essentially, the
introduction of litigation costs eliminates the indifference of intermediate-
valuing plaintiffs who, in the absence of litigation costs, knew they were not
destined to contract regardless of their signal. These plaintiffs now have an
incentive to signal a desire to sell their entitlement: the desire to avoid
litigation costs.
Let us turn now to part (2), to wit: If the plaintiff signals that she wishes
to purchase the defendant's option, both the $40 and $60 defendants pool in
issuing an asking price of $15. Any plaintiff valuing more than $70 will in fact
accept this offer. Note that the imposition of litigation costs will tend to lower
the pooled asking price (from $17.50 in our original Article to $15 now), and
increase the range of accepting plaintiffs (from $85 and up before to $70 and
up now). This increase in efficiency-enhancing transactions is due to both
parties' wishes to avoid losing litigation costs from nonconsensual takings.
Because the threat of litigation costs increases the marginal costs of bargaining
breakdown, the defendant will not attempt to extract as much from the
plaintiff, and the plaintiff will be more willing to accept the defendant's offer.
Conversely, if the plaintiff signals that she wishes to sell her entitlement,
as described in part (3), $60 defendants will bid infinitesimally more than the
plaintiff's net gain from taking-that is, slightly more than $40.42 The
plaintiff will know that this bid must have come from a high-valuing
defendant.43 Nonetheless, the plaintiff will accept this bid, since she knows
it is marginally more than she might expect if the defendant were forced to
litigate.
The exposed $40 defendant, on the other hand, will offer $20 to buy from
the plaintiff, and the plaintiff will accept only if her valuation is less than
$20.44
42. Because litigation costs (e,) are slightly less than $10, the plaintiff's net payoff from a
nonconsensual taking would be $50 - ($10 - e), which simplifies to $40 + eL. It is an equilibrium of the
model for $60 defendants to offer to buy for $40 + eL, and for all plaintiffs with valuations less than $70
to accept. The $60 defendant's strategic choice is more difficult. She now has two options in making her
bid. First, the $60 defendant can attempt to pool her bid with that of the $40 defendant, as was the case
in the zero-litigation-costs model. Second, however, the high-valuing defendant might consider making a
bid that reveals her valuation to the plaintiff but makes the plaintiff marginally better off than if the
defendant had simply decided to take nonconsensually. When litigation costs are $10 for each party, this
type of "separating" equilibrium is exactly what we find.
43. A $40 defendant would never bid more than $40 for the plaintiff's entitlement.
44. A few notes on varying the litigation-cost parameter are in order. When litigation costs exceed $50,
it is common knowledge that the plaintiff will never bring suit, and thus a liability rule effects a de facto
prodefendant property rule. When litigation costs are between $10 and $50, it is common knowledge that
the plaintiff will bring suit, and as such, that the defendant does not pose a credible threat to take. See
Talley, Liquidated Damages, supra note 3, at 1233-35. In this instance, a liability rule effectively imposes
a proplaintiff property rule.
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B. Liability Rules Can Facilitate a More Efficient Equilibrium-Even When
There Is No Nonconsensual Advantage
This litigation-cost model more clearly distinguishes the consensual and
nonconsensual advantages of liability rules. Even though in this model the
liability rule is less efficient than the property rule when bargaining is not
allowed, the liability rule becomes more efficient than the property rule when
bargaining is allowed. In other words, even when the liability rule does not
have a nonconsensual head start, it can still be more efficient because of a
consensual advantage. Even though litigation costs impose a nonconsensual
"friction" (which, absent bargaining, makes the liability rule less attractive than
a property rule), the liability rule's ability to facilitate bargaining more than
makes up for the property rule's head start.
WELFARE: WELFARE: INCREASE IN WELFARE
No BARGAINING BARGAINING DUE TO BARGAINING
PROPERTY RULE $50.00 $59.75 $9.75
LtALmnY RULE $45.00 $61.75 $16.75
TABLE 1. Applying Kaplow and Shavell' Welfare Analysis
to the Litigation-Cost Model
Table 1 applies Kaplow and Shavell's own analysis to the litigation-cost
model. While bargaining under a property rule increases welfare by $9.75,
bargaining under the liability rule induces an increase of $16.75. Using Kaplow
and Shavell's own criterion,45 the "increase in welfare due to bargaining" is
when damages are less than $10, the $40 and $60 defendants do not completely separate (after
hearing that the plaintiff wants to sell her entitlement). Instead, the $60 defendant plays a mixed strategy
where it pools with the $40 defendant's bid with probability a and separates (by making the revealing $40
bid) with probability 1 - a4 where:
(40 - 4c)(D - 40 + 3 C)
D = the damages amount, and C is the litigation cost born by each party. So in our example if C = 9.99
and D = 50, the probability that a $60 defendant will pool is only about a tenth of one percent.
45. Requiring liability rules to produce larger absolute reductions in inefficiency is an overly stringent
criterion for determining whether liability rules facilitate trade because this criterion does not take account
of the ceiling created by first-best (Coasean) efficiency. To see this, consider again the original example
in Solomonic Bargaining, in which, under a liability rule, bargaining raised welfare by $4.875 (from $55
to $59.875). Counterfactually, if a liability rule had been able to facilitate first-best efficiency, welfare
would have risen by $8 (from $55 to $63) because, under our assumptions about the plaintiff and defendant
valuation, $63 represents the first-best. But under Kaplow and Shavell's absolute increment criterion, even
inducing first-best trade would not mean that the liability rule had succeeded in facilitating trade, because
the absolute increment bargaining that increased welfare under a property rule was $9.75-which would
still be more than the $8 increment for this hypothetical liability rule.
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greater with the liability rule than with the property rule. This by itself
suggests that we have succeeded in providing a numerical example (depicted
graphically in Figure 2) in which liability rules facilitate trade.
Perhaps more important, however, is the fact that the introduction of
litigation costs makes the liability rule even more efficient than when there are
no litigation costs. Bargaining under a liability rule does not merely recapture
the $10 inefficiency created by litigation costs in autarky;4 6 it in fact increases
the expected social welfare under a liability rule from $59.88 without litigation
costs to $61.75 with these costs.
As shown in Figure 3, litigation costs have divergent effects on consensual
and nonconsensual inefficiency. Litigation costs increase the nonconsensual
inefficiency of the liability rule by $10 (as represented by the change from
point N to point N'). However, allowing bargaining under the liability rule not
only avoids litigation costs,47 but also channels a wider class of plaintiffs to
engage in welfare-enhancing trade by selling their option to take
nonconsensually (as represented by the change from L to L'). Even if we
ignore the negative impact of litigation costs on the liability rule's efficiency
in autarky (thus assuming counterfactually that a liability rule produces the
point-N inefficiency of $8), bargaining under a liability rule vitiates a larger
fraction of the initial inefficiency (84.375%) than does bargaining under a
property rule (75%). Figure 3 depicts this result by the fact that L' lies below
Kaplow and Shavell's original "Liability Rule2" line.
Litigation costs make liability rules more efficient in this example because
they enhance the partitioning effect that we emphasized in Solomonic
Bargaining. Under the liability rule, litigation costs induce even more value-
enhancing trade.48
Comparing the proportional reductions in inefficiency-rather than the absolute reductions-is a
superior criterion for distinguishing between consensual and nonconsensual advantages, see Kaplow &
Shavell, supra note 1, at 228 n.25, because liability rules only "facilitate trade" if they can
disproportionately eliminate the autarkic inefficiency. We relate these two standards to Figure 1, supra note
24.
46. Without litigation costs, a liability rule under autarky produced expected welfare of $55; with
litigation costs, the expected welfare is only $45.
47. In our equilibrium, no litigation occurs, because all $60 defendants agree either to buy the
entitlement or to sell their option to take.
48. In this litigation-cost model, liability rules also induce more contracting than property
rules-indeed, three times as many people will reach agreement under a liability rule than under a property
rule. In their original working paper critiquing Solomonic Bargaining, however, Kaplow and Shavell
questioned the normative importance of this type of result: "[Flully half of the agreements concluded under
liability rules produce no increase in welfare because these agreements do not alter outcomes; rather these
agreements arepure extortions." Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining?
A Reply to Ayres and Talley 9-10 (Harvard Law School Program in Law and Economics, Discussion Paper
No. 159, Apr. 1995). Kaplow and Shavell are right that, in equilibrium, half of the agreements are between
parties who would not behave differently in the absence of agreement, but they fail to mention that half
of the "pure extortions" come from $60 defendants who agree to buy the plaintiff's entitlement for $17.50
when they would have been willing to take nonconsensually and pay damages of $50. What might as easily
be characterized as "consumer surplus" becomes "pure extortions" in their eyes.
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Even if we restrict ourselves to the Kaplow and Shavell standard, liability rules in the textual example
can induce more "agreements that increase welfare" than property rules. With litigation costs, a liability
rule induces 60% of the bargainers to reach agreements that increase welfare (while a property rule induces
only 25%). This 60% is composed of:
(1) high-value plaintiffs who will successfully deter inefficient taking by $60 defendants (15% of total
bargainers);
(2) low-value plaintiffs who will successfully sell their entitlement to $40 defendants, who
inefficiently would have failed to take (10% of total bargainers); and
(3) mid-range plaintiffs who will sell their entitlement to $60 defendants to deter nonconsensual
takings that would have consumed $20 in litigation costs (35% of total bargainers).
Thus, litigation costs increase the absolute efficiency of liability rules for two reasons. First, more
high-value plaintiffs succeed in deterring $60 defendants from inefficiently taking: Without litigation costs,
only plaintiffs with valuations greater than $85 succeed in bribing; with litigation costs, plaintiffs with
valuations above $70 deter these inefficient takings. Second, more low-valuing plaintiffs succeed in selling
their entitlement to $40 defendants: Without litigation costs, only plaintiffs with valuations below $15 sell
to $40 defendants; with litigation costs, plaintiffs with valuations up to $20 succeed in this efficient
transfer.
If the government knows the distribution of plaintiff and defendant valuations, it might be able to
choose the damage amount that maximized expected welfare. But in the absence of this information about
underlying valuations, observing the proportion of bargainers who reach agreement might provide some
valuable information about where to set the damage rule. Indeed, while far from a general result, in the
litigation-cost model the liability rule that maximizes the amount of contracting also maximizes the
expected payoffs. The notion is that the parties' revealed preference for agreement provides some solace
that goods are traveling toward higher-valuing users. After all, if transacting were costless, we might expect
to see a large proportion of bargainers entering into some type of transaction. Many scholars have erred
in thinking that property rules are necessarily more "market encouraging" than liability rules, but the idea
of using revealed preferences in contracting as a crude proxy for efficiency suggests that our finding that
75% of bargainers reach agreement under a liability rule while only 25% reach agreement under a property
rule would by itself provide prima facie evidence of the liability rule's efficiency.
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ImI. CONCLUSION
Kaplow and Shavell have derived a firmer foundation for the Calabresi and
Melamed head start, and they have argued persuasively that this nonconsensual
advantage of liability rules will tend to persist once trade is allowed. They
were right to challenge us to differentiate more clearly between this
nonconsensual advantage and our proposed consensual advantage-that the
information-forcing effect of liability rules could facilitate trade. By
incorporating litigation costs into our original model, we have done just
this-showing that liability rules may induce more efficient postbargaining
outcomes even when no nonconsensual advantage exists. If we had needed to
make some unnatural assumption to generate this result, we might be justly
accused of "theory mining.' 49 But our new example, by incorporating
litigation costs, moves us, if anything, closer to the real world.
In closing, let us focus on points of agreement. The a priori assertion that
property rules are efficient when transaction costs are low, because property
rules force people to contract, needs to be qualified. We have shown that
liability rules can be more efficient when imperfect information is the only
transaction cost and that liability rules can induce more people to contract than
property rules.
Kaplow and Shavell's persistence conjecture describes a powerful
tendency, but property rules still will often be efficient despite the
nonconsensual advantage of liability rules; in this Comment, we have
demonstrated that liability rules can still be efficient even when property rules
hold a nonconsensual advantage. We believe that this new example
demonstrates that "information forcing" can cause liability rules to be more
efficient than property rules.
Our disagreement with Kaplow and Shavell about what causes liability
rules at times to be more efficient than property rules threatens to obscure the
bottom-line policy question of identifying when liability rules are likely to be
more efficient than property rules. Distinguishing between the consensual and
nonconsensual causes of efficiency can aid in the ultimate inquiry by allowing
us to identify circumstances that enhance or retard a particular cause.5"
49. "Theory mining" is a neologism that refers to how theorists might contrive assumptions to generate
a pathological result. (It is analogous to "data mining" in econometrics.) A consequence of theory mining
is that, when the parameters are changed only slightly, the result goes away. In fact, in a more formal
context of incomplete information, Talley has shown that a large set of litigation costs, so long as they do
not destroy the credibility of threats to take or sue, can even lead to first-best outcomes under bargaining
(so called ex post efficiency), where property rules are incapable of inducing such bargaining advantages.
See generally Talley, Property Rights, supra note 3.
50. For example, we argue that liability rules are less likely to facilitate consensual trade if (1) the
liability-rule damages are tailored, see Ayres & Talley, supra note 1, at 1065, or (2) the private information
of the plaintiff is not the predominant impediment to efficient trade, see id. at 1047.
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Bargaining under imperfect information often leads to complex and subtle
equilibria.5 Given the richness of these equilibria, it should not be surprising
that the information-forcing effect of untailored liability rules might give rise
to nontrivial efficiencies. Indeed, our treatment of liability rules represented
only a part of our argument in Solomonic Bargaining. Any type of entitlement
division52 necessarily creates the possibility for two types of Coasean trade:
A bargainer can either sell her share of the entitlement or buy the other side's.
Our larger thesis remains that bargaining in the shadow of these two types of
agreements can induce bargainers to speak more forthrightly and thereby
facilitate Coasean trade.
51. See generally Ian Ayres & Rob Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice
of Legal Rules, 101 YALE W. 729 (1992)
52. Solomonic Bargaining discussed a wide array of such divisions including probabilistic, physical,
temporal, or activity-level divisions, as well as the way that liability rules divide an entitlement by making
ownership subject to a takings option. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 1, at 1034-35 & n.24.
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